


Ethnicity and Nationalism in Turkey: Before and After the 2002 Elections

This article aims to investigate the issues of ethnicity and nationalism before and after the 2002 general elections in Turkey. In doing so, I shall compare the results and motivations of the April 1999 and November 2002 elections in order to see their reflections in terms of ethnicity and nationalism in Turkey. Before comparing the two elections in detail, I will make some general informative remarks about ethnicity and nationalism in contemporary Turkey.

URKEY is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country, housing approximately 50 different Muslim and/or non-Muslim ethnic groups, some of which are Sunni Turks, Alevi Turks, Sunni Kurds, Alevi Kurds, Circassians, Lazis, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs, Assyrians etc. However, leaving aside the last decade of democratization attempts, the Turkish State has been far from recognising the ethnically and culturally diversified nature of Turkish society since the foundation of the Republic in 1923. Ethnic groups in Turkey have been subject to homogenising formal state policies, some of which are part of the nationalist Turkish history thesis of 1932, placing the Turks into the centre of world civilisation; nationalist education policies; banning the use of mother tongue and of ethnic minority names; discriminatory settlement policies *vis-à-vis* exchange populations and new migrants; implementation of *Wealth Tax* in 1942, particularly to non-Muslims; and forced migration of Kurds in the east and southeast of Turkey.

These kinds of assimilationist and/or exclusionist state policies have eventually shaped the ways in which ethnic groups developed their identities. In order to survive in Anatolia, former generations of ethnic groups preferred to assimilate to mainstream political culture in Turkey, which was dominated by homogeneity, Sunni Islam and Turkishness. The work of Moiz Kohen Tekinalp (a Jewish-origin Turkish nationalist), *Turkification*, 1928 (*Türkleştirme*), is illuminating in the sense that he pointed out the main incorporation strategies for non-Turkish ethnic minorities into the political system. He proposed 10 commandments to the Turkish-Jews for their incorporation with the Turkish nation in the nation-building process: “1. Turkify your names; 2. Speak Turkish; 3. Pray in Turkish in synagogues; 4. Turkify your schools; 5. Send your children to Turkish schools; 6. Deal with national issues;

7. Stick together with Turks; 8. Affiliate yourself with the community spirit; 9. Fulfil your duties in the national economy; 10. Be aware of your rights.”¹

On November 3, 2002, Turks experienced one of the most striking elections since the beginning of the multi-party system in 1946. The elections were apparently an expression of the deep hatred, anger, and insecurity felt by Turkish electorate against poverty, social inequality, corruption, chronic economic crisis, unemployment, moral erosion, partisanship, nepotism, clientalism and on-going inefficient coalitions. Voters replaced the established political class with the Islamic-rooted conservative *Justice and Development Party* (AKP) with 365 parliamentary seats, and brought *Republican People’s Party* (CHP) back to the parliament with 177 seats after one term of absence. Granting the government to the *Justice and Development Party* very well explains the quest of people for *justice* and *employment* – two terms both implicitly and explicitly found in the title of the party. Not so surprisingly, the major political parties setting up the conventional political system, the centre-left *Democratic Left Party* (DSP), *Nationalist Action Party* (MHP) and *Motherland Party* (ANAP) failed to pass the 10 percent national threshold required for having seats in the parliament. The *True Path Party* (DYP) missed the threshold narrowly with 9,5 percent of the vote to get into the Parliament. Surprisingly enough, the newly established conservative nationalist *Young Party* (GP), led by a media mogul, Berlusconi-like Cem Uzan, managed to attract 7,3 percent of the voters. Despite many corruptions in which the leader of the party involved, Young party set up another alternative for the Turkish electorate due to its anti-systemic political discourse opposing the supremacy of the IMF, World Bank, American power and Customs Union with the European Union.²

What differentiates the recent election from preceding elections is the nature of transformation

undertaken by the religious-based political parties. The only winner of the recent elections, the *Justice and Development Party*, has undergone a remarkable modification since the early 1970s. The AKP primarily represents reformist factions, led by Tayyip Erdogan (Prime Minister), Abdullah Gül (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Bülent Arınç (Head of the Parliament) within the *National View* tradition established over the years following the historical sequence of *National Order Party* (Milli Nizam Partisi), *National Salvation Party* (Milli Selamet Partisi), *Welfare Party* (Refah Partisi), *Virtue Party* (Fazilet Partisi) and *Felicity Party* (Saadet Party).³ The reformists generating from within the Islamic *National View* tradition favour pragmatic strategies concerning incorporation with current global flows in the market economy, universal human rights and democracy. They face a historic opportunity to reform Islamic politics in Turkey and establish true liberal political parties after all those troublesome experiences encountered by preceding Islamic-oriented political parties as in the closure of the National Salvation Party after the 1980 military coup and that of the Welfare Party (RP) after the so-called 'post-modern coup' on February 28th, 1997.⁴

The Right Ticket for the 1999 Election: Formal and Informal Nationalisms

The main fault line of previous election had been minority and majority nationalisms while that of the last has been poverty and the troubled economy.⁵ Another essential difference between the two elections is that while the principle runners of the 1999 election were the political parties, the state and its organs, the 2002 elections were directed not only by political parties and the state, but also by "non-state actors such as economic pressure groups, civil society organisations, and even international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU)." (Keyman and Öniş, forthcoming). Thus, unlike the 1999 elections posing a national affair, the 2002 elections became a 'glocalised' affair bringing global economic concerns and national political concerns together. The result of the recent elections testifies that the alignment with non-state actors such as civil society associations and the European Union was essential in the success of the two winning parties, the AKP and the Republican Peoples Party (CHP).

The April 1999 general election could be marked with the resurgence of Turkish majority nationalism *vis-à-vis* Kurdish minority nationalism. Extreme right and state-centred Nationalistic Action

Party (MHP) backed up by the Turkish military elite received a great welcome by the electorate, enlarging its vote to 18 per cent and constituting the second biggest party in the parliament after the Democratic Left Party, which had a nationalist left discourse before and after the elections. The two winners of the elections agreed to establish a coalition government with the liberal-conservative Motherland Party, which was fitting very well into the nationalist fabric of the other two. One of the common denominators of those parties was their allegiance to the formal nationalist ideology as well as their endeavour to benefit from rising Turkish popular nationalism against Kurdish minority nationalism.

The 1999 Elections were held in a political climate, in which majority and minority nationalisms in Turkey reached certain limits. The resurgence of Kurdish nationalism resulting from on-going assimilationist and/or exclusionist Turkification policies⁶ and chronic economic deprivation in the East, the loss of around 30 thousand people's lives in the last twenty years, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) during the office of Bülent Ecevit (DSP) in January 1999, the rise of Islamic movements, and the refusal of Turkey by the European Union are the principal sources of the acceleration of both formal and informal Turkish nationalisms.⁷ Previously, some new popular nationalist rituals had already become visible in the public space in a way that revealed the anger, hatred and pathetic character of the nation *vis-à-vis* the endless terror in the country. Some examples could be given to illustrate the rising informal popular Turkish nationalism against the Kurdish minority nationalism: Reproducing the nation by collectively vocalizing the anthem in the first league football matches;⁸ reconfirming the loyalty and worship to the nation by madly celebrating the new conscripts while seeing them off to the army; remembering the mythical first decade of the Turkish Republic by popularising the '10th Anniversary March'; reconfirming the belief in the nation by flagging up the Turkish flags everywhere on cars, bags, belt-buckles, tattoos, necklaces, rings and etc.; reconstituting national sentiments by making the unwavering flags visible in the public sphere such as in newspapers and TV;⁹ and strengthening the faith in community by showing a great interest in the massive celebrations of national days.¹⁰

Recently, the idea of the state has been remarkably reproduced through everyday practices of people outside the centres of official power. As Navaro-Yashin rightfully states:

"In life rituals of bidding farewell to soldiers, in the mundane activity of watching national soccer

games on TV, in hanging flags up in private quarters in anxiety and festivity, and in many other daily life practices, ordinary people in Turkey reproduce an idea of the Turkish state. Many commonplace events in public culture in Turkey enhance and normalize, rather than challenge the construction of the Turkish State."¹¹

In Foucaultian sense, the popularity of these rituals symbolises the fact that the idea of a state takes its shape in the lives and beliefs of ordinary people, and contributes to the embodiment of a form of 'public statism'.¹² Such a judgment may also explain the sources of the 'deep state' (*derin devlet*), which has been intensively discussed since the notorious accident in Susurluk, Balıkesir.¹³ Describing the rituals of popular nationalism as 'public statism' also reminds of a press conference speech given by Mehmet Ağar, the former ultra-rightist Minister of Interior Affairs during the DYP-RP coalition government between 1995 and 1997: 'There is no 'deep state' as such. The State is in the minds of our obedient citizens.' Despite such a problematic and one-sided discourse, Ağar's speech very well reflects the fear and obedience present in the relationship of ordinary people with the state.

Similarly, formal state nationalism had also reached its outer limits just before the 1999 election. The coalition government (DSP, MHP and ANAP) and state agencies successfully employed popular nationalism, which was already in charge. Militarism, Kemalism, Atatürk fetishism, rigid secularism, monoist republicanism, and anti-multiculturalism became the pillars of the new regime established with the new coalition government in 1999. The government, then, was in line with the three main pillars of Kemalist ideology: 1) an official dominant discourse based on a homogenous Turkish nation and an exclusionary social contract denying the cultural diversity of Turkey; 2) the denial of different identities and ethnicities in the public sphere; and 3) treatment of politics as a process of guiding political development and engineering a new society. Hence, Kemalism does not consider social, political, cultural and ethnic differences as an indispensable constituent of democracy, but rather regards them as a potential source of instability and a threat to national unity.¹⁴ Kemalist ideology gained momentum as a form of provincial and parochial reactionary nationalism *vis-à-vis* the devastating effects of globalisation appearing in the form of politics of identity, culture and ethnicity.¹⁵ Besides, the discouraging decision taken at the Luxembourg Summit by the European Union at the expense of Turkey's candidacy further provoked nationalist sentiments in the country. This was also the time when the post-Kemalist, Second

Republican, and Neo-Ottomanist liberal ideas were restrained by the oppressive state apparatus.

A separate emphasis should be made here concerning the consistent flow of Kurdish votes in the South East Anatolia to the Kurdish origin *People's Democracy Party* (HADEP, which became the Democratic People's Party, DEHAP, in 2002). In the 1999 elections, the party received almost 5 percent, and increased its vote upto 6.5 percent in the 2002 elections. Many allegations have been hitherto addressed to HADEP that it had organic links with the PKK. Recently, the Constitutional Court made a decision to ban the party due to those links. The decision is believed to be judicial, but not political. The Democratic People's Party, successor of the HADEP, has also been subject to similar allegations. Although, the decision of the Court is judicial, there are serious doubts about the possibility of Kurdish ethnic resurgence upon the closure of the party.

The Post-Helsinki Period: Moderate Turn Towards Democratization

However, the European Union Helsinki Summit on 10-11 December 1999 moderately reversed the reactionary nationalist mood in the country by declaring Turkey as 'a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states'. The European Union Copenhagen political criteria, passed at the EU summit in Copenhagen in 1993, require full implementation of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities. The decision taken in Helsinki represents a turning point in Turkish-EU relations and has created an optimistic environment for the resolution of ethnic, cultural and religious minority issues in Turkey, particularly of the Kurdish question.

Both majority society and other ethnic groups including the Kurds enthusiastically received the decision in Turkey. It is apparent that recently many ethnic minority groups in Western Europe have been trying to surpass the nation-states, to which they have been subjected, by bringing their issues to the European Union bodies. Basks, Corsicans and Catalans have, for instance, taken their demands on a transnational basis into the European Commission to be solved. Kurds, Alevites and other ethnic minorities in Turkey are also engaged in similar political manoeuvres. In fact, they have rational reasons to do so. Many Kurds, for instance, are attracted by the notion of a 'Europe of Regions' capable of providing the context for political accommodation between the Turkish Republic and

the Kurds.¹⁶ Similarly, other ethnic and/or religious groups such as Alevis, Circassians, Georgians and Lazis are also captivated by the democratic quality of the Union, which denounces cultural homogeneity and celebrates cultural diversity. The European Union has recently declined the use of minority discourse due to the escalation of minority problems in Europe. As could be clearly seen in the Accession Partnership Document, which maps out the requirements of Turkey in the integration process into the EU, the term 'minority' has been replaced with the term 'cultural diversity' in order to celebrate diversity in unity. Consequently, ethnic group associations in Turkey have already abandoned minority politics in the face of the currently changing political discourse in the West.

The Helsinki summit has led to the moderation of the official political discourse in Turkey regarding the recognition of cultural and ethnic diversity. Mesut Yılmaz, president of the Motherland Party, openly stated that "(...) *the road to the EU passes through Diyarbakır... Democracy is the right of both the Turk and Kurd... We cannot transport Turkey into a new era with a nation offended by the state, with a system that views the society as a threat, with a bureaucracy that belittles the citizen, with a republic that ousts the individual, and with a political system that is impotent in the face of these adversities.*"¹⁷ Along the same line, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem announced that *'broadcasting in other mother tongues should be allowed.'*¹⁸

Nevertheless, some of the other state officials such as former Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, and General Secretary of the National Security Council, Cumhur Asparuk, were hesitant in vocalising such moderate views. They were rather sceptical to such democratic attempts in the sense that such attempts could "tear apart the mosaic of Turkish society."¹⁹

In the post-Helsinki process, Günter Verheugen, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, visited Ankara in July 2000 and submitted a draft Accession Partnership Document listing legal reforms to be implemented before Turkey's full membership to the Union. During his visit, he caused a major uproar in Turkey due to the articulation of the word 'minority' referring to various ethnic groups in Turkey, particularly the Kurds. The reason for such a reaction was that the term 'minority' only corresponds to the non-Muslim groups such as Armenians, Jews and Greeks defined as such in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Then the finalized version of the Accession Partnership Document included broadcasting and education rights for the Kurds, abolition of the death penalty, greater freedom of expression, and reform of the military-dominated National Security Council. What was striking this time was the fact that the

term 'minority', as stated before, was not used to refer to the problems of ethnic groups. What was emphasized in the text was cultural diversity, but not the term 'minorities'. The discursive shift in the text not only springs from the uproar caused by Günter Verheugen in Turkey, but also from the domestic concerns of the European Union *vis-à-vis* her internal ethnic and national challenges such as Basque, Irish and Corsican questions.

The Accession Partnership Document was in principle welcome in Turkey with some reservations by the Nationalistic Action Party and the General Staff concerning the free articulation of 'cultural and ethnic rights'. On 19 March 2001, the Turkish Government declared the National Programme stressing that "the official language and the formal education language of the Republic of Turkey is Turkish. This, however, does not prohibit the free usage of different languages, dialects and tongues by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. This freedom may not be abused for the purposes of separatism and division."

Both the Accession Partnership Document and the National Programme encouraged the foundation of further civil society organisations as well as the ethnic groups in Turkey to vocalise their search for identities. The upsurge of the civic formations outside the Turkish State, social movements, upheavals and public resistance to the state shifted the focus from the state to society. These were significant indicators of the development of an autonomous civil society. The post-Helsinki period has been decisive in the expansion of societal movements ranging from employers' associations (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association, TUSIAD, Independent Association of Industrialists and Businessmen, MUSIAD) to labour unions, or from ethnic groups to religious groups. Kurds, Alevis, Circassians, Armenians, and Assyrians are some of these groups vocalising their concerns before the European Union bodies. For instance, the representatives of major Alevi and Circassian Associations respectively had meetings with Karen Fogg, the representative of the European Union delegation in Ankara (20th June and 6th November 2000). These two meetings caused great speculations in the media and attracted firm criticisms by the official bodies in Turkey. Nevertheless, such attempts were consequential in weakening the oppressive hegemony of the Turkish state *vis-à-vis* non-Sunni and/or non-Turkish groups.

2002 Elections: The Rise and Fall of the Justice and Development Party

After taking office in November, the new AKP government began struggling deep-rooted problems such as poverty, inequality, unemployment, democ-

ratization, the Cyprus issue, the second Iraq crisis, and full membership to the European Union. Prior to these problems there was one essential problem concerning the stereotypical representation and reception of the AKP both in Turkey and abroad as a radical Islamic political party. However, it did not take long for the AKP elite to convince the western governments and Turkish society in general that it is not an Islamic formation but a centre-right party supporting secularism and the accession process to the EU.

Departing from the anti-Semitist, Islamic and exclusionist *National View* tradition, the AKP is claimed to affiliate with a form of inclusive benign nationalism,²⁰ and presents itself to the world as enlightened, tolerant, reflective, inclusive, democratic, rights-based and free-market oriented. For instance, the newly nominated Minister of Education, Hüseyin Çelik, one of the prominent ideologues of the party, summarizes the principles of the party as follows:

*"AKP strictly opposes all sorts of binary oppositions such as veiled vs. unveiled laicist vs. anti-laicists, Sunni vs. Alevi, Turkish vs. Kurdish, easterner vs. westerner and local vs. migrant... AKP is not organised along the religious, racial and cultural dispositions, but along a form of nation and nationalism based on constitutional citizenship."*²¹

The party aims to embrace all segments of Turkish society. As may be remembered, before the 2002 elections there were some mine fields posing great challenges for the candidates to come to power. Urban tension in the big cities; xenophobia towards Kurds and Roman nomads settling down in the suburbs of big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Mardin, and Izmir; diminishing agricultural production for peasantry; Islamists' anger against the Turban issue; moral erosion; poverty; corruption; social inequality; and devastating inefficiency and instability led by the preceding coalition governments were just some of the major issues to be tackled by the new government. Turkish electorate gave the majority of votes to the AKP, a political party winning the confidence of people to resolve the major problems of justice and development.

The AKP was the only political party setting up a rational option before the Turkish electorate as it was demonstrating a critical and anti-systemic societal discourse. The remaining political parties rather affiliated with statist discourse. Thus, the AKP was able to attract the Turkish electorate that it was going to provide them with an alternative to the present statist political system. Actually, Tayyip Erdogan had already begun to prepare the ground for his ascendancy to power while he was the mayor of Istanbul. He had done so by getting engaged in solving the problems of marginalized people in ghettos. He was, even then, a candidate to govern the country. In an

interview with Jenny B. White, he said: "The system has degenerated. We want a human system, with true roots. The state is not a chieftain; it is a servant to the nation."²² He was willing to be the spokesperson of those subaltern people, and his will had also received a warm welcome outside Istanbul, the biggest metropolitan city. As known, peripheral and marginal groups have been infiltrating the centre by making their troubled situation visible to the wider public since the early 1990s. The events in Gazi Mahallesi, which is a suburb in Istanbul, is illustrative in this sense;²³ or the previous May Day 'celebrations' turning into plundering and violent attacks of what we may call 'underclass groups', 'fourth world', and/or 'ethno class groups', to the wealthy segments of Turkish society. Antagonistic sentiments, taking place in the coastal locations of the Aegean region between locals and Kurds who have been subject to forced migration from the eastern provinces, set up another example along the same line. Growing hatred and xenophobia have emerged against Kurds, Alevis, Romans, Circassians, Armenians etc. who are not considered to be 'Sunni Turks'.

Those who are stuck in their remote ghettos are destined to search for a ticket way out. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan portrayed a kind of saviour and a role model for these subaltern groups. A recent survey revealed that one third of the inhabitants of Istanbul - a city located on the shores of the Bosphorus and Marmara Sea - have not seen the sea in their lifetime. During his office in the Istanbul municipality in the second half of the 1990s, Erdoğan started a new service for those living in the periphery of the city: free public transportation for all during the national holidays and religious festivities – a time when the inhabitants of the city centre tend to move out for vacation. This is the time for hundreds thousands of subalterns to go to the centre for window-shopping and touristic purposes. Such an investment is one of the reasons of Tayyip's success in the long run.

The other reason is related to his social background. Born in 1954 and raised in the suburbs of Istanbul, a theological high school graduate, and an ex-football player, Tayyip Erdogan is not really a fully educated man. He found himself as one of the followers of Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the ongoing anti-secular political movement in Turkey. In 1984, he became the head of the Welfare Party's Beyoğlu branch, then of Istanbul province, and in 1985 entered the party's inner management circles. In 1994, he was elected mayor of the city of Istanbul. He considered political life as the ticket way out. He is the only political party leader in Turkey so far, who is called after his first name by most of the Turkish population: 'Tayyip'. This is also an indication of his popularity among the working-class people and peasants. However, AKP also managed to receive the support of the newly emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie, or what is called the 'Anatolian

tigers' settled in Kayseri, Çorum, Maraş, Gaziantep, Diyarbakır and many others.²⁴

However, AKP's performance in the first six months has not satisfied the optimistic expectations generated by most of the Turkish population just after the elections. AKP was granted an open cheque by many people as it had claimed to give priority to societal demands rather than to parochial state-centred concerns. Day after day, it has turned out that AKP has had a gradual draw-back from almost all its earlier political promises and positions concerning the Cyprus question, Iraq crisis, economic stability, unemployment, relations with the IMF and World Bank, and the High Education Committee. On the contrary, the AKP managed to decline many of the societal demands, and became more inclined towards state centrism as its predecessors. Thus, a major attempt towards the foundation of a strong civil society outside the Turkish State apparatus seems to wither away.

Conclusion

The main concern of this article was to explain the issues of ethnicity and nationalism in Turkey before and after the 2002 general election. In doing so, emphasis was given to the fault lines of the

two consecutive elections in 1999 and 2002. It was argued that the main determinant of the former was the rising informal and formal nationalisms, in which the two winning political parties (DSP and MHP) profoundly invested before the national election and the European Union Helsinki Summit. In the post-Helsinki period the government relatively has given up exclusionist nationalist policies, and has become rather inclined towards inclusionary policies *vis-à-vis* ethnic and religious groups. It was also argued that the Helsinki decision was very decisive in turning the Kurdish minority into being more incorporative with the Turkish political system, and in making other ethnic groups raise their concerns to the EU delegation in search for democratization in many respects. On the other hand, the 2002 elections were shaped by widespread popular concern concerning poverty, social inequality, corruption, chronic economic crisis, unemployment, moral erosion, partisanship, clientelism and previous inefficient coalitions. It was claimed that the AKP government has set up an alternative to the conventional political system with its societal oriented discourse. Yet, so far it has failed in implementing what it had promised in the party programme before the elections.

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Notes

- ¹ Cited in Landau, 1996.
- ² For a detailed analysis of the Young Party including the use of media, image-creating, and communication technologies see Turan and Çapan, 2003.
- ³ For a detailed explanation on the historical transformation of the Islamic-based National View see, White, 2002.
- ⁴ For a detailed explanation of the transformation of religious parties in Turkish politics see Yeşilada, 2002.
- ⁵ For a similar interpretation of the 2002 Elections see Keyman and Öniş (Forthcoming).
- ⁶ For further information on Turkification policies since the foundation of the Turkish Republic see Aktar, 2000.
- ⁷ For an anthropological account on popular nationalism see Eriksen, 1993. Eriksen makes a distinction between state controlled 'formal nationalism' and societal 'informal nationalism', which is considered to be both popular and spontaneous.
- ⁸ For a brilliant anthropological account on the culture of nationalism and statism in soccer in Turkey see, Navaro-Yashin, 2002.
- ⁹ Michael Billig (1995) calls this form of nationalism 'banal nationalism', which is embedded into the routines of daily life. The latent banal nationalism is everywhere in Turkey. It is in your newspaper, right at the top of the first page, with the logo saying 'Turkey belongs to the Turks'; and/or it is in the songs screaming 'Either love or leave your country'. For further explanation on the widespread usage of Turkish flags see Navaro-Yashin, 2002.
- ¹⁰ For a detailed explanation of Turkish popular nationalism see, Özkırımlı, 2002; and Navaro-Yashin, 2002.
- ¹¹ Navaro-Yashin, 2002, p. 134-135.
- ¹² Navaro-Yashin rightfully states that the idea of state is embedded into the daily lives and practices of ordinary people in Turkey. See, Navaro-Yashin, 2002, Chapter 4.
- ¹³ On November 4, 1996, a truck crashed into a car on a highway in a town called Susurluk. The bodies of four people were found in the car: a parliamentarian, Istanbul's former vice-head of police, a pan-Turkist mafia leader, and a prostitute with a false identity card. All died except the parliamentarian. This accident was the proof that politicians and the police had relations with the mafia. This accident brought about heated discussions about the existence of a 'deep state' beyond the limits of the actual Turkish state apparatus. See, Navaro-Yashin, 2002, Chapter 5.
- ¹⁴ For a detailed explanation of Kurdish nationalism see Yavuz, 2001.
- ¹⁵ For a further analysis of Kemalist nationalism in contemporary Turkey see, Lindisfarne, 2002.
- ¹⁶ For a further analysis on the reflections of the Turkish-Kurds upon the Accession Partnership Document and National Programme see, Yavuz, 2001; and Ekinici, 2001.
- ¹⁷ 'Yılmaz: Road to EU passes through Diyarbakır', *Turkish Daily News*, 17 December 1999.
- ¹⁸ 'Interview with Ismail Cem', CNN-Turkey, 12 December 1999.
- ¹⁹ *Financial Times*, 17 February 2000.
- ²⁰ For a broader critical review on benign nationalism including 'constitutional patriotism', 'postnational nationalism', 'civic nationalism', 'multiculturalism', see Fine, 1999.
- ²¹ Çelik, 2003.
- ²² Cited in White, 2002, p. 139.
- ²³ *Gazi Mahallesi* is a ghetto dominated by *Alevi* residents. Some hostilities started when an unknown gunman in a stolen taxi fired a number of shots against a group of men sitting in a *café*, killing one *Alevi* (March 1995). The police were remarkably slow in taking action, and the rumour soon spread that the local police post might have been involved in the terrorist attacks. The day after, thousands of *Alevi* people from the Gazi neighbourhood went on to the streets to protest about the murder. The police and the demonstrators clashed, and the police killed fifteen *Alevi* demonstrators. For further information see Kaya, 2001.
- ²⁴ 'Anatolian tigers' are over 50 Islamic-oriented companies such as Kombassan Holding and Ihlas Holding. Business practices of these companies, having representatives in 20 other countries, follow both Islamic and modern rules. See, Yeşilada, 2002, p. 78.

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Этничность и национализм в Турции: До и после выборов 2002 года

Статья написана профессором департамента международных отношений университета Стамбула Айханом Кайя. Целью статьи было исследование проблемы этничности и национализма в свете выборов 2002 года в Турции. Для сравнения автором были взяты данные выборов 1999 и 2002 годов, роль этих двух феноменов в них. Автор приходит к выводу, что в выборах 1999 года национализмы меньшинств и большинства играли довольно значимую роль, в выборах же 2002 года в центре внимания стояли бедность и нестабильная экономика.

